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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL RAY DOBSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48528-2020
Ada County Case No.
CR01-20-32991
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Dobson failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
when it imposed a unified 10-year sentence with four years fixed upon Dobson’s guilty plea to
felony DUI?
ARGUMENT
Dobson Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
In August 2020, in Boise, Dobson sideswiped a parked Amazon delivery vehicle as he

was driving down the street, and then started to drive away. (PSI, p.90. 1) The driver of the
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Citations to page numbers of the PSI refer to the page numbers of the electronic file containing
the PSI and other documents.
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delivery vehicle followed Dobson and called the police. (Id.) Apparently because he saw that
the delivery driver was following him, Dobson stopped his vehicle. (Id.) There, the delivery
driver asked Dobson if he was drunk, to which Dobson responded in the affirmative. (Id.)
Dobson then tried to give the delivery driver containers of alcohol that he had in his vehicle, but
the delivery driver refused.

(Id.)

Just before the police arrived, Dobson became angry,

prompting the delivery driver to call the police again to express that he was concerned that
Dobson would escalate his behavior. (Id.)
Dobson admitted to a responding officer that he had been drinking that day. (Id.) The
officer also noted that Dobson had glassy and bloodshot eyes, emitted the odor of alcohol, had
impaired speech, and had some instability in his walking. (PSI, pp.90-91.) Dobson refused the
standard field sobriety tests and indicated that he would also refuse a breath test. (Id.) Dobson
was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence. (PSI, p.91.) A warrant for a blood
draw was obtained, and subsequent testing revealed a .202 BAC. (PSI, pp.91, 94.)
Because Dobson had a prior felony DUI conviction, the state charged him with felony
DUI. (R., pp.25-26.) Because Dobson’s driver’s license was suspended, and because he left the
scene after sideswiping the Amazon delivery vehicle, the state also charged him with driving
without privileges and failing to provide info at the scene of an accident. (Id.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Dobson pled guilty to felony DUI, and the
state dismissed the other two charges. (R., pp.27, 30-41.) The state agreed to recommend a
unified 10-year sentence with four years fixed, and Dobson was free to argue for a lesser
sentence. (R, pp.27, 40-41.) At the sentencing hearing, Dobson recommended that the district
court retain jurisdiction or impose an intensive probationary period. (Tr., p.10, L.2 – p.11, L.14.)
Noting that this was Dobson’s fifth DUI conviction, and expressing concern for the safety of the
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community, the district court instead followed the state’s sentencing recommendation and
imposed a unified 10-year sentence with four years fixed. (R., pp.45-49; Tr., p.12, L.9 – p.16,
L.3.) The district court subsequently denied Dobson’s I.C.R. 35 motion for reconsideration of
sentence. (R., pp.50, 55-57.) Dobson timely appealed from the judgment of conviction. (R.,
pp.51-53.)

On appeal, Dobson challenges the district court’s sentencing determination.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-7.)
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering

the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). The abuse of
discretion test looks to whether the district court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194
(2018).
C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144

3

Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Id. at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895-96, 392
P.3d 1228, 1236-37 (2017) (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628
(2015)). It is well established that the primary sentencing consideration is protection of society,
and that all other factors must be subservient to that end. State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 627,
873 P.2d 877, 881 (1994).
Prior to imposing sentence in this case, the district court referenced the appropriate
sentencing factors, and noted that it had reviewed and considered the PSI and Dobson’s
sentencing argument and statement. (Tr., p.12, L.18 – p.13, L.4.) After acknowledging that
Dobson was not an “irredeemable person,” and discussing the dangerousness of Dobson’s
conduct in this case and his extensive criminal record of driving under the influence, the district
court imposed a unified 10-year sentence with four years fixed. (Tr., p.13, L.5 – p.16, L.3.) A
review of the record supports the court’s sentencing determination.
This was Dobson’s second felony DUI conviction, and fifth DUI conviction overall.
(PSI, pp.7-8.)

Dobson was still on probation for his prior DUI, and his license was still

suspended, at the time he drove drunk again and sideswiped the Amazon delivery vehicle. (PSI,
pp.7-8, 30-37.) Drinking alcohol and refusing the field sobriety and breathalyzer tests were all
violations of his felony probation. (PSI, pp.30-37.) His prior felony DUI resulted in a 75-day
jail sentence with 10 years probation (PSI, p.7) – it was not unreasonable for Dobson’s new
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felony DUI sentence to include significantly more incarceration, particularly considering that the
prior supervised probation did not prevent Dobson from driving drunk again.
The district court was appropriately concerned with the severe danger to the community
created by Dobson’s conduct in this case. During the sentencing hearing, the delivery driver
stated that if Dobson had sideswiped his vehicle three second later than he did, he would have
been smashed against his vehicle while he was getting out of it. (Tr., p.7, Ls.3-10.) The district
court properly recognized that these few seconds were the difference between the property
damage that occurred and Dobson instead causing severe injury or death. (Tr., p.14, Ls.5-8.)
Further, both of Dobson’s felony DUI convictions involved an enhanced BAC (.202 and .268,
respectively). (PSI, pp.94, 97.) In the prior felony DUI incident, Dobson was so intoxicated that
he stumbled and fell onto the officer when he left his vehicle. (PSI, p.97.)
On appeal, Dobson does not take issue with any of the stated analyses as set forth by the
district court, but instead simply asserts the existence of certain mitigating factors – including his
substance abuse, remorse, amenability to treatment, a history of stable employment, and family
support. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-7.) However, nothing in the record indicates that the district
court failed to consider any of these things, or chose to disregard the information about these
factors presented in the presence investigation report and Dobson’s sentencing argument and
statement. Instead, the court noted several times that it did not believe that Dobson was a bad
person, but that his poor judgment when drinking endangered the community, even while on
supervised probation after a previous exercise of poor judgment, and even after periods of time
of apparent sobriety. (Tr., p.13, Ls.5-14; p.14, L.18 – p.15, L.12; p.16, L.24 – p.17, L.5.) The
court also noted that while it understood that relapsing is a part of addiction, the pressing
question is whether an addict can use the tools they have been given to deal with the relapse in a

5

way that does not endanger the community or themselves, or whether, as in Dobson’s case, they
fail to do so. (Tr., p.14, Ls.9-17.)
In light of all of the factors discussed above, the district court acted well within its
discretion to impose a unified 10-year sentence with four years fixed upon Dobson’s conviction
for felony DUI, his fifth DUI conviction. Dobson has therefore failed to demonstrate that the
district court abused its sentencing discretion.

This Court should affirm the judgment of

conviction.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the sentencing determination of the
district court.
DATED this 25th day of August, 2021.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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